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Status: Stable Version: 1.0.0 Author: Rifteo Tags: pentest, security, infrastructure
★ Top 5 benchmark result: Eliminates false positives — turns unconfirmed SSRF indicators into confirmed, exploitable vulnerabilities. Same model, same target.
Installation

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Summary

Detect and exploit Server-Side Request Forgery from injection point discovery through cloud credential theft and internal network takeover.
  • Phase 1 maps all SSRF injection points: obvious URL parameters, less-obvious parameters (PDF renderers, file importers, webhook callbacks), and non-URL parameters that trigger fetches
  • Phase 2 confirms SSRF using OOB callbacks (Burp Collaborator, interactsh) and classifies the result (non-blind vs. blind, filtered vs. full response)
  • Phase 3 exploits cloud metadata endpoints for AWS IMDSv1/v2, GCP, and Azure stealing IAM credentials, service account tokens, and managed identity tokens
  • Phase 4 enumerates internal network services via SSRF port scanning (Redis, MySQL, MongoDB, Docker API, Kubernetes kubelet)
  • Phase 5 abuses protocol handlers: file://, gopher://, dict:// for Redis command injection and SMTP relay
  • Phase 6 covers filter bypass techniques: IP encoding (decimal, hex, octal, IPv6 mapped), localhost aliases, redirect chains, DNS rebinding
  • Includes an automation script and a complete report structure

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SKILL.md file

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SSRF Hunter

Server-Side Request Forgery occurs when a server fetches a user-controlled URL, allowing attackers to reach internal services, cloud metadata, and resources behind firewalls that are otherwise inaccessible.

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What Does It Check?

In scope:
  • URL parameters: ?url=, ?proxy=, ?fetch=, ?preview=, ?link=
  • Non-obvious parameters: PDF/image renderers, file import/export, webhook callbacks, XML <url> tags, OAuth redirect parameters
  • Cloud metadata: AWS IMDSv1/v2, GCP, Azure IMDS
  • Internal services: Redis, MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Elasticsearch, Docker API, Kubernetes kubelet
  • Protocol handlers: file://, gopher://, dict://, ftp://
  • Filter bypass: IP encoding, localhost aliases, redirect chains, DNS rebinding
Out of scope:
  • Other vulnerability classes use dedicated skills for XXE, IDOR, etc.

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How It Works

Phase 1: Find Injection Points
Also check: ?source=, ?file=, ?pdf_url=, ?screenshot=, redirect_uri=, X-Forwarded-Host, ?sitemap=.Phase 2: Confirm SSRF
Phase 3: Cloud Metadata Exploitation
Phase 4: Internal Network Enumeration
Phase 5: Protocol Handler Abuse
Phase 6: Filter Bypass

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Output

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Known Limitations

  • AWS IMDSv2 requires token-based authentication test whether the app forwards custom headers
  • Blind SSRF has limited direct impact but can be escalated via DNS exfiltration or chaining with other bugs
  • DNS rebinding attacks require external tooling (singularity) and specific DNS TTL conditions

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Benchmark Results

Tested on claude-sonnet-4-6 via Claude Code CLI. Same prompt, same model, same target. The only variable is whether the skill is loaded.

xxe-phantom

Complete XXE detection and exploitation methodology file read, blind OOB, SAML vectors, and SSRF chaining

redirect-forge

Complete open redirect methodology SSRF chaining, OAuth token theft, and bypass techniques

hpp-hunter

Complete HTTP Parameter Pollution methodology includes SSRF via HPP scenarios