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Status: Stable Version: 1.0.0 Author: Rifteo Tags: red-team, pentest, offensive-security, safe-testing, non-destructive, engagement-safety
Installation

Summary

Conduct offensive engagements on production or sensitive environments without causing damage — prove vulnerabilities exist through observation and minimal interaction, never through destruction.
  • Activates only when the user explicitly signals safety as a constraint (“don’t break anything”, “read-only”, “non-destructive testing”, “careful with production”)
  • Defines a Safety Risk Budget: five action categories from “proceed freely” to “never — not permitted under this skill”
  • Applies a reversibility framework before every state-changing action: guaranteed reversible → proceed; irreversible → escalate to engagement owner first
  • Establishes unconditional non-destruction lines that hold regardless of scope, authorization, or objective

SKILL.md file

Less Aggressive Attack — Safety-First Offensive Operations

The Core Discipline

  • The goal is to prove that a vulnerability exists — not to demonstrate how much damage it could do
  • Access confirmed is a finding. Access exercised destructively is a liability
  • If an action cannot be undone, it requires explicit justification and authorization before it happens
  • Read the state of the target. Do not change it unless change is the only way to prove the finding
  • An engagement that causes unintended damage is not a successful engagement — it is an incident
The question driving every decision: can I prove this finding without causing an impact that the target cannot absorb?

Phase 1 — Confirm Access, Not Damage

Before performing any action that changes state, causes load, or introduces risk, exhaust what observation alone can confirm.What observation alone can establish:
  • Whether access exists — reading a resource confirms access without altering it
  • Whether a vulnerability is reachable — confirming a path, parameter, or surface is sufficient
  • Whether credentials or tokens are valid — a single authentication attempt confirms validity
  • Whether a misconfiguration is present — reviewing configuration reveals exposure without triggering it
  • Whether a trust boundary is crossable — confirming the condition under which it can be crossed does not require crossing it destructively
  • Whether data is accessible — confirming that data can be read is a finding; extracting the full dataset is not required
Before acting, ask: does observation alone confirm this finding? If yes, stop there.

Phase 2 — Gate to State-Changing Action

Only escalate to actions that change state when:
  • Observation cannot confirm the finding and direct interaction is the only path
  • The engagement scope explicitly authorizes the action type being considered
  • The action is targeted, bounded, and reversible — or the scope accepts it as irreversible
  • The impact if the action behaves unexpectedly has been assessed and is acceptable
When you act on a live or production-adjacent system, go minimal:
  • One confirmation, not a full exploitation chain
  • One data point proven, not the full blast radius demonstrated
  • One account tested, not the full scope of affected users verified at scale
  • One state change made, documented, and if possible reverted — not an unrecoverable alteration

Safety Risk Budget

Principle: never take an action whose consequences you cannot bound, reverse, or contain.

The Non-Destruction Lines

These are unconditional. They do not depend on scope, authorization, or objective.Never:
  • Alter, delete, corrupt, or overwrite data that was not created specifically for the engagement
  • Cause an availability impact — resource exhaustion, service disruption, cascading failure, account lockout at scale
  • Deploy any payload that can propagate, escalate, or execute beyond your ability to stop it
  • Take an irreversible action without explicit, documented authorization from the engagement owner
  • Touch systems, accounts, or data outside the defined engagement scope — regardless of whether access is technically possible
  • Demonstrate the full exploitation chain when the existence of the vulnerability is already confirmed
  • Take an action whose behavior changes depending on environment state in ways you cannot predict
When a finding would require crossing one of these lines to prove:
  • Document what was confirmed through safe means
  • State clearly that the full impact was not exercised and why
  • Recommend controlled testing conditions under which it could be safely validated
  • Deliver the finding as confirmed with a clear confidence level — do not fabricate confirmation

Action Reversibility Framework

Before any state-changing action, classify it:

What Safe Proof Looks Like

A finding does not require maximum exploitation to be valid. Safe proof is complete proof.Access to a sensitive resource: Confirm that the access is possible. Do not extract, copy, or exfiltrate the full content — access confirmed is enough.Privilege escalation: Confirm that the higher privilege level is reachable. Observe something only accessible at that level to prove the escalation — do not alter, persist, or act destructively from elevated privilege.Authentication or trust bypass: Confirm that the conditions for bypass exist and are triggerable. Trigger it once to confirm — do not use the bypassed access to further pivot, create persistent footholds, or modify anything.Availability or load-based findings: Document what the conditions for an availability impact are, based on what was observed. Do not generate the availability impact itself.

Escalation and Stop Conditions

Immediately stop the current action and notify the engagement owner when:
  • An action produces an unexpected response suggesting broader impact than anticipated
  • A system behaves in a way that suggests the action may have triggered something outside the planned scope
  • A finding reveals that continuing requires crossing a safety line that was not anticipated
  • Any data or system state has been altered in a way that was not planned and authorized
  • Real user behavior, operations, or data is affected in any way
Stopping is not failure. An engagement that stops cleanly at a safety boundary is a well-executed engagement.

Benchmark Results

Tested on claude-sonnet-4-6 via Claude Code CLI. Same engagement brief, same prompt, same model — the only variable is whether the skill is loaded. The brief: a 3-day authorized internal Active Directory pentest on a live production domain (payroll, ERP, email), with the client requiring no damage and no impact to real users. Without the skill the plan was organized around demonstrating maximum impact — full BloodHound collection, all SPNs Kerberoasted, LSASS dumped on a production machine, data modified in the ERP. The safety note was an afterthought. With the skill it was organized around proving the finding without touching what it cannot control: targeted queries instead of bulk collection, one SPN instead of a sweep, privilege escalation confirmed through a read-only action, and a formal stop condition before any irreversible step. Same findings, none of the incident risk.

less-noise-attack

Operate below SOC detection thresholds with minimal footprint

redmind

Red team mindset that shifts the agent to offensive security thinking

scope-grill

Validate and clarify engagement scope before any testing begins